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In this article we argue for an empirical governance approach—the use of public
evaluations—as one basis for deciding whether and how to regulate decisions with public
consequences. We propose a conceptual framework for evaluating public acceptability,
notably that public judgments should be evaluated against five criteria: overall acceptability
ex ante; robustness; consensus; procedurality; and their ranking on nonfairness issues such
as cost and convenience. In the article we also move beyond theory to implementation by
modeling our framework to evaluate public judgments concerning acceptability in the
contentious area of land-use decisions in Florida.
Data from a survey of Florida stakeholders offer several interesting findings about five
procedures currently in use to make land-use decisions: private negotiation; public hearings
conducted by elected local officials; administrative law hearings; judicial adjudication; and
public referendums. Based on the above five criteria, judicial adjudication is evaluated as
the most desirable of these procedures through which to govern land-use decisions.
Respondents view judicial and administrative adjudication differently, a finding that raises
important questions concerning the appropriate roles for, and structure of, administrative
and judicial adjudication. Referendums receive mixed reviews, while public hearings, the
most common form of decision-making procedure in the land-use arena, are the least
acceptable. In short, as the article details, our findings in the specific context of land-use
decision-making procedures raise interesting and important questions about the most
appropriate procedure through which decisions should be made in this arena and whether
there are ways to revise procedures to improve their acceptability to the public. Further, the
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findings raise important questions across policy arenas about the appropriate use and
structure of different types of decision-making processes.
Our more general objective is to offer a framework for using empirical governance to
consider and, ultimately, enhance the public acceptability of government decision-making
processes. Our basic premise in this project is that to further good governance, government
should make decisions using procedures in which the public has confidence and that will
increase public acceptance of such decisions.
I. Introduction
This article explores public views concerning the acceptability of different procedures for
making land-use decisions, based on responses to a survey we developed for stakeholders in
Florida communities in which these land-use decisions are to be made. Each respondent is
asked to indicate his or her willingness to accept the results of alternative procedures for
making land-use decisions—four procedures in which a decision is regulated in some
manner by the larger community, and one procedure involving unregulated negotiation
among the parties directly involved in the land at issue.
The study begins with the premise that if decisions that affect the public are to be
regulated, it is important to consider public views about how that regulation should occur.
One obvious criterion is whether people indicate that a particular form of regulation will
produce decisions that they are willing to accept, that is, that the procedure would be
authoritative. Our analysis also considers four additional potentially important criteria
beyond authoritativeness by which procedures for making land-use decisions might be
evaluated: whether the procedure is robust in the face of experience (i.e., whether ex post
evaluations differ from those that are ex ante); whether there is a consensus among major
community stakeholders about the desirability of a procedure; whether the procedural has
procedurality;1 and whether the procedure is strong or weak on nonfairness issues that
affect preferences (e.g., delays and costs associated with a process). Procedurality involves
two features. First, that the procedure is not evaluated as acceptable based simply on its
likely outcome. Second, that the procedure is evaluated as acceptable based on the features
of procedural fairness that it displays.2
An analysis of the respondents’ views about the five procedures through this larger
conceptual framework suggests that judicial adjudication is the preferred procedure for
1The term “procedurality” is used in technical discussions of computer programs to refer to the framework of the rules
that define how a program is executed. In other words, it refers to the procedural features of how a program is
executed, rather than to the outcomes produced. We use it here to emphasize the focus on how a procedure
functions, not its outcomes. As we note, studies have repeatedly shown that people distinguish between how
procedures function and the outcomes they produce, although they typically see the two issues as related.
2As is often the case, there are different options for defining each of these criteria. For example, some have suggested
that it is appropriate to subsume the costs of procedures within the category of procedural justice rather than treat them
separately as we do here (Solum 2004). Following this approach, our framework would consist of four criteria rather
than five. We explain in Section III.D why we prefer the five-part framework we have proposed in which we separate
nonfairness concerns (delay, cost, etc.) from traditional procedural justice issues (e.g., quality of treatment, neutrality).
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regulating land-use decisions, at least in comparison to the other procedures studied in this
survey. As we detail below, each of the other procedures has various strengths and weak-
nesses when viewed through this framework. Moving beyond the arena of land use, the
article concludes by considering the implications of the findings, and framework, for
developing a general model of empirical governance.
The procedural justice literature provides one lens for considering issues of institu-
tional design. From the perspective of effective and efficient conflict management, it is
important to resolve disputes through procedures that maximize decision acceptability.
One example of the importance of procedural justice research in the area of institutional
design is the widespread development of alternative dispute resolution programs such as
mediation (Tyler 1989). Although there are multiple approaches to mediation and gener-
alization is risky, studies have found that mediation is desirable, at least in some circum-
stances, because disputants are more willing to defer to decisions made by mediation than
they are to adjudication decisions (Sternlight 1999; Tylser 1989). Hence, institutional
designs can be shaped by an understanding of the consequences of resolving disputes in
different ways, consequences determined at least in part by postuse deference by the parties
involved.
Our goal is to broaden the scope of subjective evaluations used in institutional design
see (Tyler 2008). We believe that the views of people in the community are also important in
making ex ante decisions about which procedures will be used to make decisions. This means
that public views would be used during the initial development of procedures to decide what
procedures would be in place in a community when decisions need to be made at some later
date. Taking account of public views involves ex ante judgments of how decisions should be
made in the future rather than relying on postuse satisfaction. In making such judgments,
people are making general decisions about how they want their community to be regulated.
We refer to the use of subjective ex ante judgments when making procedural choices as
“empirical governance” because our focus is on incorporating public views into decisions
about the appropriate procedures for managing decisions in the community.
Our framing of the institutional design question follows the early efforts of Thibaut
and Walker (1975), who were concerned with choices among trial procedures. Their study
compared subjective views about the inquisitorial and adversary trial procedures. They
studied both ex ante and ex post judgments. Their findings suggest that prior to using a
procedure, people prefer an adversary trial. Further, after experiencing trials, people are
more willing to accept the results of an adversary trial. Hence from their perspective, those
people personally involved in disputes prefer the same type of procedures both ex ante and
ex post. Other studies have raised questions about this conclusion, demonstrating that
people focus on different issues when they evaluate procedures ex ante and ex post (Tyler
et al. 1999). In particular, Tyler et al. found that people involved in disputes are more
strongly influenced by procedural justice issues in posthoc evaluations.
Our concern in this study is with the abstract ex ante judgments people make about
how to make future land-use decisions in their community. These evaluations reflect
general judgments about how communities should manage private decisions that also have
collective consequences for the community. The people interviewed are not asked about a
decision concerning land use in which they are directly involved and that would be made
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by one or another of the procedures; rather, they are making abstract judgments about how
their community should decide future land-use questions.
People within our society operate within a framework of private property within
which they enjoy considerable freedom to act as they wish. For example, property rights
broadly entitle community residents to use their property as they wish; to buy and sell that
property if they desire and for a price they negotiate and agree to with other parties.
However, like most private rights, property rights are exercised within a framework of rules
through which the public interest is expressed via the regulation of private decisions and
actions. At the most fundamental level, it is important to ask whether the public views such
regulation as acceptable. By acceptable we mean that people indicate a greater willingness
to accept the decisions made through a procedure involving public control than to accept
decisions made via private negotiation. To the degree that public control is accepted, we
want to identify the procedures through which the public would like to see that control
exercised.
A large body of research supports the argument of the procedural justice model, that
is, the argument that people’s reactions to their experiences with legal authorities are
strongly shaped by their subjective evaluations of the justice of the procedures used to
resolve their case (Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler 2006a; Tyler & Huo 2002). The procedural
justice literature has generally focused on people with personal experiences with legal
authorities and has been concerned with their postexperience evaluations of the legal
system and willingness to accept its decisions. This literature, which might therefore be
broadly characterized as a literature on postuse “consumer satisfaction,” demonstrates that
people are strongly influenced by the justice of the procedures they experience when they
go to court or deal with the police. As noted, our goal is to broaden the use of subjective
evaluations in institutional design. We believe that the views of people in the community are
also important in making ex ante decisions about which procedures should be used to make
decisions.
Our particular focus is on land-use decisions made within different communities
within Florida. Our question is how people in these communities prefer to deal with
regulating the land-use decisions made in their communities. We are interested in identi-
fying the procedures that people feel lead to acceptable land-use decisions. We contrast
private ordering via negotiation among the affected parties to four procedures that involve
some form of public regulation. Those four regulatory procedures are: via public hearings
by local elected authorities; via hearings by administrative law judges; via judicial adjudica-
tion; and via public referendums.
We evaluate land-use procedures against five criteria of acceptability. The first is
public willingness to accept the results of a procedure. The second is the robustness of the
procedure in response to personal experience. Third, we ask whether there is a consensus
among stakeholders in the community concerning the acceptability of a procedure. Fourth,
we consider whether the acceptability of a procedure is based on two concerns: the
estimated likelihood of prevailing through the procedure and the degree to which the
procedure has the features associated with a just procedure. Fifth, we consider nonfairness-
related issues such as the costs of participating in a procedure, delays associated with
different processes, and the like.
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After applying these five criteria to the five procedures we conclude that people view
judicial adjudication as the most appropriate procedure of the five we reviewed for regu-
lating land-use decisions, and prefer it not only to the other public procedures, but also to
private negotiations. More broadly, we suggest that the five criteria we define provide a
framework within which empirical governance should occur. That framework is based on
five primary dimensions: acceptability, robustness, consensus, procedurality, and nonfair-
ness concerns.
II. Considering Public Engagement and
Oversight Conceptually
A. Public Control of Land-Use Decisions
In many situations, land-use decisions have implications for the community. If a farmer sells
his land to someone who builds a shopping center, a developer tears down an old home and
builds two new and larger houses on that lot, or the government builds a new school or sites
a landfill, these decisions impact the public, which deals with problems such as traffic
congestion and with the need to provide increased sewage, schools, fire, police, and other
support services, which may increase taxes, have adverse environmental consequences, or
otherwise affect the quality of life. Hence, in such situations, the public may view regulation
as desirable and endorse its use. To borrow from the economics literature, people may be
especially likely to favor regulation in situations that involve externalities of various types
(Polinsky & Shavell 2000).
Beyond this, a variety of literatures generally suggest the value of public engagement
in community planning and environmental decisions. There are normative reasons for
believing that public involvement in decision making is valuable, and calls for increased
public involvement have become louder and more pressing in recent years (Carpini et al.
2004; Markell 2005; cf. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002). Thus, even though psychologists
argue that people generally prefer to have as much freedom as possible to conduct private
transactions such as buying and selling at prices that they have freely negotiated with others
(Thibaut & Walker 1975), the call for greater public participation in environmental deci-
sion making is hardly a new idea (Charnley & Engelbert 2005; Halvorsen 2001; Hunt &
Haider 2001; McFarlane & Boxall 2003; Stephan 2005; Weber & Tuler 2001). On the
contrary, calls for increased public involvement are widespread. Our concern is with the
manner in which such public involvement occurs, that is, with the procedures by which
the public or its representatives regulate private transactions. We address several questions.
First, does the public want to be involved in the process of land-use management, as
opposed to leaving such decisions to negotiation among the directly involved parties?
Second, if so, what types of third-party procedures are most desirable?
B. Criteria for Evaluating Procedures: An Overview
There are a wide variety of procedures through which the public could potentially have
a role when land-use decisions are being made. Some of those procedures provide
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an oversight role to societal authorities, as occurs when political or legal authorities
make decisions, while others involve direct public involvement, for example, in public
comment procedures for public hearings or a public referendum. How can those various
alternative procedures be evaluated? One approach is to evaluate procedures against
normative criteria.
Within law, normative approaches to procedural evaluation are widespread (see
Solum 2004). Solum argues that procedural rules can be defined on philosophical terms
and, when that is done, three principles are key. The first principle is participation, that
each party has the right to meaningful participation (2004:305). The second principle is
accuracy, with procedures designed to maximize the likelihood of achieving the legally
correct outcome (2004:305). Finally, the third principle is that in cases of conflict, partici-
pation is more important than accuracy (2004:306). In each case, procedures are chosen to
achieve these objectives based on their philosophical features, not in terms of public
evaluations. Solum indicates that “satisfaction with the process is not the whole story about
procedural fairness,” but also observes that “[t]his narrow point does not force the conclu-
sion that litigant satisfaction is unimportant or that it should not be considered in the
evaluation and comparison of specific procedures” (2004:266–67). In short, there is more
to procedural design from this perspective than public evaluations of procedures. However,
it is equally true that Solum, like many legal scholars, views public reactions to procedures
as relevant to their desirability. In other words, public views should be included in some way
when procedures are being designed.
Like Solum, we believe that a procedure’s desirability lies, at least in part, in issues of
public satisfaction. Our goal here is to develop a framework within which we can evaluate
different procedures for exercising public influence over land-use decisions through a
subjective framework that is based on the views of the public. The framework we propose
involves five dimensions: acceptability, robustness, consensus, procedurality, and nonfair-
ness concerns.
1. Acceptability
Our first criterion for evaluating procedures for making land-use decisions is whether
people accept the results of the procedure. This ability to gain acceptance is one aspect of
legitimacy (Tyler 2000a, 2000b), for example, the capacity of a process to produce decisions
to which people are willing to defer. From our perspective, authoritativeness, the ability to
make decisions that resolve issues, is central to the effectiveness of law and that capacity is
our focus in this analysis.
Our concern is with the evaluations of acceptability made by the public. The willing-
ness to accept decisions is important because a core function of decision-making proce-
dures is to resolve problems in ways that are acceptable to the people affected by those
problems. If people do not accept the outcome, they may object to the procedure and
continue to protest and seek to undermine its implementation. Further, the implementa-
tion of the agreement will sour people’s relationships and undermine their cooperation,
which is contrary to a key goal of the legal system: to foster good feeling and the mutually
beneficial exchanges that flow from it (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 1995, 2002).
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Our general argument is that procedural acceptability is important because when a
procedure has it, it is able to be authoritative, engendering deference concerning its
suitability for dealing with the question and making decisions to which people will defer.
The argument that people’s willingness to defer to a procedure’s decisions is linked
to their views concerning the procedures by which those decisions are made and imple-
mented is widely supported by research on legal (Paternoster et al. 1997; Pruitt et al. 1993;
Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Tyler 2006b; Tyler & Fagan 2008; Tyler & Mitchell 1994), political
(Grimes 2006; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 1995, 2002; Tyler et al. 1985), managerial (Elsbach
2001; Tyler & Blader 2000), and environmental (Hunt & McFarlane 2007; Manger et al.
2000; Mueller et al. 2008) decision-making procedures.
So, as a beginning point, we suggest that the desirability of procedures can be
evaluated in terms of the degree to which people are willing to accept them and the
outcomes they yield. We test such willingness by examining whether any of four forms of
public procedure is more acceptable than negotiation, a finding that would show that the
public is more willing to view as acceptable decisions made through procedures that take
account of community concerns. Our test is both absolute, in that we ask people how
acceptable the results of each of the procedures are, and relative in our comparison of that
acceptability to the acceptability of other public procedures and to negotiation among the
directly affected parties.
2. Robustness
We further argue that it is desirable to have procedures that retain their acceptability after
they are directly experienced. This is the case because procedures that are put in place
within a community will, over time, be experienced by ever greater numbers of people. If
the experience with a process undermines its acceptability, then the process will not be
sustainable over time, since the very implementation of such procedures in the community
creates the basis for objections being raised about them. For a procedure to be sustainable
as an approach to managing issues of land use, it must be usable without being under-
mined. Robustness refers to such sustainability. Inclusion of this ex post check on ex ante
preferences as part of our framework is quite rare in the literature and is an innovation in
design that warrants careful thought for future research. A recent study of both ex ante and
ex post evaluations of dispute resolution procedures suggests both that ex ante preferences
do not necessarily predict ex post satisfaction and, moreover, the accuracy of predictions of
ex post acceptability based on ex ante views may vary by procedure (Shestowsky and Brett
2008; Utset 2003).
An example of the issue of procedural sustainability is found in recent responses to
terrorism. Law enforcement agencies have engaged in a number of practices that are more
intrusive than was typical when policing against crime was their major goal. For example,
they search handbags on subways, question people in their homes about links to terrorists,
and question community leaders in their neighborhoods. Such policies have led to an
increase in the number of people in the community who have personal experience with
police practices. If the consequence of such experience is to view the police more negatively,
then the practices are not sustainable in the long run (Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2005).
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Similar, but less dramatic, effects occur in the everyday interactions people have with
the legal system. If people resent personal encounters with the police, then, over time, their
support for law and cooperation with the police is undermined (Tyler & Fagan 2008). If
people leave the courts dissatisfied with trial procedures, they will both lose their respect for
the legal system and will, in the future, seek nonjudicial ways to resolve their disputes.
Hence, a key issue is whether the use of a procedure shapes evaluations of its acceptability.
An example of an effort to examine the robustness of court procedures is provided
in a statewide evaluation of the courts conducted in California (Rottman 2005). This study
is based on a sample of the residents of California. It considers the influence of knowledge
about the courts gained by personal experience and the media on judgments about the
courts. The most common form of experience was jury duty. Overall, this study found that
personal experience with the courts as a juror increased confidence in the courts, while
experience as a litigant lowered approval of the courts. The findings illustrate a potential
problem of legal procedures: that direct experience can undermine confidence in the law
and, more generally, in societal governance.
More broadly, a key issue is how public views are shaped. From a public policy
perspective, what is important is that a procedure be sustainable and, hence, robust to
influences of the social environment. In a situation such as land-use decisions in Florida,
the decisions made by any particular procedure often have widespread dissemination in the
community via both informal social networks and the mass media. A procedure that
becomes illegitimate as people become aware of its implementation is not robust.
To test the robustness of procedures in the face of personal experience, we compare
users and nonusers of each procedure. If those who have past personal experience with a
procedure indicate willingness to accept its outcomes, this suggests that the procedure will
continue to be legitimate if it is widely adopted in a community and afterward generally
experienced by community members. In our analysis, we consider two issues: first, the
respondents’ personal familiarity with a procedure through their own use; and second,
respondents’ familiarity with a procedure because others (e.g., members of one’s family,
friends, and/or neighbors) have used the procedure. This second issue reflects the impact
of informal social networks.
3. Consensus
Third, we suggest that consensus is a desirable quality for a procedure. If a procedure’s
legitimacy is not widespread within a community, it will be less effective in bridging
differences. For example, Tyler (1994, 2000a) demonstrates that the basis for evaluations of
the courts does not differ across demographic categories. As an example, rich and poor
respondents evaluate the courts in the same manner, placing identical weight on issues of
procedural justice and defining it in similar ways.
To assess consensus in this study, we examine the degree to which legitimacy varies as
a consequence of ideology, ties to the community, interests, and/or demographics.
In the case of ideology, our suggestion is that a procedure is more desirable if it is
acceptable to people across the ideological spectrum. In this study, we consider three
aspects of ideology. First, judgments of procedures may differ depending on whether
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respondents generally have a liberal or a conservative ideology. The same judgments may
differ depending on the extent of the respondent’s trust in government. We measure trust
at the local and state levels. Third, we ask about trust in nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and the development community. In each case, we suggest that a strong procedure
is one that is acceptable to people at all points of the ideological spectrum, rather than to
one particular group.
A second important issue is the degree to which respondents are psychologically
connected to their local community. Tyler and Degoey (1995) argue that the nature of
people’s identification with their community alters their relationship to government and
government procedures. In particular, people who are more identified with their commu-
nities are less motivated by self-interest and more motivated by their judgments of what is
procedurally fair. Hence, people who differ in their degree of involvement with their local
community may view different types of procedures as most appropriate for resolving
community issues such as land use. In a study of water-allocation procedures, Tyler and
Degoey (1995) found that those who identified with their community more strongly
favored allowing government authorities to make water-allocation rules.
Third, we evaluated consensus by examining respondents’ self-interests. People
whose position in the community differs, for example, environmental activists versus devel-
opers, have different goals and varying definitions of a desirable outcome.
Four possible positions in the community are distinguished: government official;
citizens’ group member/environmentalist; property owner/businessperson/developer; or
attorney/consultant.
Finally, we consider standard demographic information: race, income, education,
gender, and age.
4. Procedurality
A fourth criterion against which we can evaluate procedures involves procedural accept-
ability. Here, our concern is not with whether people will accept the results of a procedure,
but with why.
Theorists of procedural justice argue that we want to have procedures that are
accepted for their procedural qualities, not their anticipated outcomes (Tyler 2006b). In
other words, if everyone involved chooses a procedure and says they will accept its outcome
because they anticipate that the outcome will be the one they want, then after they actually
experience that procedure in a conflict situation, at least some people will be disappointed,
since it is unlikely that everyone can win. If, on the other hand, for example, they prefer a
procedure because they believe that it is just on procedural grounds, then it is easier to
imagine that everyone would be able to feel that the procedure considered the facts and was
acceptable, irrespective of its ultimate outcome.
We argue that procedures that encourage people to accept their outcomes due to
the nature of the procedure itself are more desirable. Following Easton (1965), we will
refer to such procedures as having a “cushion of support” for decisions. Over the last 20
years, a large psychological literature has suggested that people are strongly influenced by
their assessments of the procedural justice of different methods of allocation and conflict
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resolution. A clear example of such a procedure is the adversary trial. Research shows that
people accept whatever verdict is reached in such a trial to a certain degree because they
judge it to be a fair procedure on procedural grounds, since it allows both parties to present
their case to a decisionmaker in advance of decisions and because the decisions made are
believed to reflect the neutral application of clear and consistent rules (Thibaut & Walker
1975). A number of studies have shown that judgments about the justice of the procedures
used to resolve conflicts have a strong influence on feelings about and willingness to accept
decisions (Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler 2006b). The literature on procedural justice is robust
and suggests a powerful tool that authorities can use to facilitate dispute management.
Such subjective procedural justice judgments have been the focus of a great deal of
research attention by psychologists because they have been found to be a key influence on
a wide variety of important group attitudes and behaviors (Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler 2006b).
Procedural justice has been especially important in studies of decision acceptance and
rule following (Tyler 2006b). One reason that people defer to rules and authorities is
that they receive desirable rewards for cooperating and/or fear sanctioning from the group
for not cooperating. An alternative reason that people might comply is that they are
motivated by their sense of justice to accept what they feel is fair, even if it is not what they
want (Tyler 2007).
A key question is whether justice is effective in resolving conflicts and disagreements
when people cannot have everything they want. To the degree that people defer because
allocation decisions are seen as fair, justice is an important factor in creating and main-
taining social harmony. Research suggests that social justice can act as a mechanism for
resolving social conflicts, and that procedural justice is especially central in such situations
(Tyler 2006b).
As we have noted, John Thibaut and Laurens Walker conducted the first experiments
designed to show the impact of procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker 1975). Their studies
demonstrated that people’s assessments of the fairness of third-party decision-making
procedures predicted their satisfaction with outcomes. This finding has been widely con-
firmed in many subsequent laboratory and field studies of procedural justice, studies
showing that when third-party decisions are fairly made, people are more willing to volun-
tarily accept them (Tyler 2007). What is striking is that such procedural justice effects are
widely found in studies of real disputes, in real settings, involving actual disputants, and are
found to have an especially important role in shaping adherence to agreements over time.
In this analysis, we address two questions. First, do people prefer a procedure because
they believe that they are likely to win if that procedure is used? For purposes of this article,
from our perspective, a desirable procedure is one that is not chosen because of its likely
outcome. Second, do people prefer a procedure because of procedural qualities? We argue
that this is a desirable attribute.
5. Elements of Procedural Justice
In the prior section, we argue that procedural justice matters. To explore the influence of
procedural justice, we need to define and measure procedural justice. Procedures can be
viewed as fair for different reasons. The two core reasons that studies of procedures suggest
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people use to decide whether procedures are fair are: quality of decision making (voice,
neutrality) and quality of treatment (trust, courtesy/respect) (Blader & Tyler 2003a,
2003b). In this analysis, we will not focus on any particular procedural element, but will
consider the general influence of procedural justice. To do so, we will use a scale that
combines measures of these four elements.
a. Voice/Representation. People want to have the opportunity to present their side of the
story in their own words before decisions are made about how to handle the dispute or
problem. Having an opportunity to voice their perspective has a positive effect on peoples’
experience with other parties irrespective of the outcome, as long as they feel that the
authority sincerely considered their arguments before making a decision. This desire for
voice is found to be one of the reasons that informal procedures, such as mediation, are
very popular. People value the chance to communicate with the mediator, indicating how
they view the problem and making suggestions concerning how it should be handled.
b. Neutrality. People bring their disputes to third parties because they view them as neutral,
principled decisionmakers who make decisions based on rules and not on personal opin-
ions, and who apply rules consistently across people and cases. To emphasize this aspect of
procedural justice, third parties should be transparent and open about what the rules are,
how the rules are being applied, and how decisions are being made. Explanations empha-
sizing how the relevant rules are being applied are helpful.
c. Respect. Authorities, whether police officers, court clerks, judges, or fellow citizens, com-
municate important messages to people about their status in society. Respect for people
and their rights affirms to people that they are viewed as important and valuable, and are
included within the rights and protections that form one aspect of the connection that
people have to society, government, and law. People want to feel that when they have
concerns and problems, both they and their problems will be taken seriously by others.
Respect includes both treating people well, that is, with courtesy and politeness, and
showing respect for people’s rights.
d. Trust. Studies of third-party authorities consistently show that the central attribute that
influences public evaluations of authorities is an assessment of the character of the deci-
sionmaker. The key elements in this evaluation involve issues of sincerity and caring. People
decide whether they believe that third parties, such as judges, are considering their views;
are being honest and open about the basis for their actions; and are trying to do what is
right for everyone involved.
6. Nonjustice Issues
Of course, not all the issues related to procedures are justice issues. In fact, discussions of
public discontent with the courts often point to issues such as cost and delay, rather than
issues of injustice (Tyler 2001). Public discussions of the courts often assume that public
discontent is linked to issues of cost and delay and, indeed, when interviewed, people often
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volunteer such reasons when explaining their views about the courts. We will also examine
the influence of these issues on acceptability. We will consider whether nonfairness issues
shape acceptability and, if so, whether that influence changes depending on the procedure.
C. Empirical Governance as a Goal
The specific focus of our study is land-use decisions, but our intention is to raise a larger set
of issues that are relevant to empirical governance (Markell & Tyler 2008). Our argument
is that public views should be an important element in efforts to design legal procedures
because of the importance of process in increasing or diminishing legitimacy. Taking that
argument seriously requires that we develop a framework within which to evaluate public
views.
The goal of this project is to offer the beginnings of a framework of empirical
governance and to use it to examine land-use decisions in Florida. However, beyond that,
our goal is to argue that empirical work should inform process design more generally,
particularly when it comes to developing government processes intended to enhance
citizen participation and, hopefully, contribute to rather than detract from the legitimacy
of our system of governance.
III. This Study
The goal of this study is to evaluate the procedures outlined against the criteria we have
discussed. To do so in an arena that matters, we chose land-use decisions, a highly conten-
tious issue in Florida communities. Further, the respondents included community
members representing perspectives ranging from property owners to environmentalists.
A. Methods: Our Sample
The questionnaire was posted on a website and interested parties were invited to complete
it.3 A number of groups were contacted and shared information about the web link with
their members and others who receive their newsletters or are on their listserves. Several
leading organizations were very helpful and shared the questionnaire with their constitu-
ents via listserves and other means. These included: (1) the leading organization in Florida
for lawyers in the field, the State of Florida Environmental Law and Land Use Section;4 (2)
3The authors will provide interested readers with a copy of the questionnaire. Please email either of the authors. The
questionnaire is also available on the publisher’s website.
4The Section is comprised primarily of attorneys and also has affiliate members in related disciplines. The
Section representative indicated that the listserve goes to approximately 1,200 people. Almost all are ELUL Section
members. Approximately 100 are affiliate members. These individuals represent the gamut of interests in the land-use
arena.
The Public Regulation of Land-Use Decisions 549
the leading state association for planners, the Florida Chapter of the American Planning
Association;5 (3) the state agency responsible for overseeing land-use regulation in the State
of Florida, the Department of Community Affairs, which sent the survey to the 11 state
regional planning councils;6 (4) the Florida League of Cities, which represents the 400+
cities of Florida;7 (5) the Florida Home Builders Association, a leading trade group for
developers;8 (6) 1000 Friends of Florida, a statewide organization with a significant focus on
land use;9 and (8) Tallahassee-Leon County Citizens United for Responsible Growth, a local
citizens’ organization interested in land use.10 Because the information was widely circu-
lated, it is not possible to calculate a response rate. A total of 228 people responded to the
questionnaire.
Standard demographics were measured: age, gender, income, education, and eth-
nicity. The demographics of the sample suggest that a range of stakeholders responded.
The sample was 7 percent 16 to 34 years of age; 11 percent 35–44; 27 percent 45–54; 39
percent 55–64; and 17 percent 65 or over. It was 45 percent female. The income distribu-
tion was 55 percent under $100,000 and 45 percent above. Sixteen percent had some
college or less; 21 percent were college graduates; 27 percent had Master’s degrees; 8
percent Ph.D.s; and 21 percent professional degrees; 87 percent were white. As is clear, this
was not a random sample of the general population, but a sample of elites.
Respondents were asked about their familiarity with different procedures in the
context of making land-use decisions. Of those who completed the questions, 86 percent
indicated personal experience with private negotiations; 96 percent with public hearings;
67 percent with administrative litigation; 52 percent with judicial legal procedures; and 41
percent with public referendums. As a result, this sample of elites likely had a relatively
good familiarity with the processes we studied.
5The Florida APA is a “non-profit organization funded through membership dues and fees.” Its listserve includes a
total of more than 3,000 individuals. The Florida APA notified its members via its October 30, 2008 monthly bulletin
and also included a notice concerning the survey in its quarterly publication, Florida Planning.
6The Director of Intergovernmental and Public Affairs for the State Department of Community Affairs (DCA) sent an
email to the 11 RPC executive directors on our behalf and we followed up with an additional email to the RPC
directors. See § 20.18, Florida Statutes (2008) for a summary of DCA’s role as the State of Florida’s land planning
agency.
7The Council published the notice in its Datagram, a newsletter sent to several hundred municipalities. October 10,
2008 email from Rebecca O’Hara to David Markell (on file with the authors).
8We asked all organization representatives with whom we talked to share with us the note they sent their members/
constituents and also to let us know how many people would likely receive the notice. The Florida Home Builders
Director of Government Affairs indicated that he was making it available to members who might wish to comment.
October 28, 2008 email from Doug Buck to David Markell (on file with the authors).
91000 Friends indicates its listserve includes about 1,200 individuals.
10We asked several other groups to send out a notice about the survey via their listserve or otherwise, but our
understanding is that they did not do so.
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B. Methodology
1. Survey of Land-Use Decision-Making Procedures
The procedures about which respondents were asked were presented at the beginning of
the survey. The procedures were:
• Informal meetings to negotiate a resolution to conflicts. It is sometimes possible to have
informal meetings with . . . interested parties to discuss possible land-use changes.
Areas of possible conflict are resolved informally among the various interested
parties.
• Public hearings—Local government officials. Elected local officials typically hold public
hearings in considering whether to amend a general comprehensive land-use plan
and in considering a rezoning request. These hearings allow people to present
their views orally and to submit relevant information in writing. Decisions are made
based on the views of elected officials about what is best for the community (1000
Friends of Florida 2004).
• Administrative hearings. A person affected by a comprehensive plan amendment
decision may file a petition for an administrative hearing convened by the State’s
Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). Those who are affected may repre-
sent themselves or be represented by counsel and may offer evidence through
witnesses and cross-examine other witnesses. Decisions are made based on the
consistency of the proposed land use with rules and regulations about land use
(Manry 2008).
• Court challenge. After a local government body makes a rezoning or other develop-
ment decision, in some situations it is possible to go to circuit court to challenge
the decision. This challenge would argue that the decision is inconsistent with
the comprehensive plan or existing laws on zoning. Decisions are made based on
the consistency of the planned land use with the comprehensive plan or existing
laws on zoning (Powell 2006).
• Ballot referendum. Before a land-use change is approved in some jurisdictions,
the jurisdiction puts the issue on the local ballot and allows the public to vote it
up or down. Decisions reflect the desires of the majority of voters.
2. Questionnaire
Respondents were asked the same questions about each of the five procedures outlined
above.
a. Acceptability. People were asked about their willingness to accept the decisions made
using the procedure to measure the degree to which a procedure was authoritative. They
were asked to agree-disagree that: “I would be willing to accept the results of this proce-
dure.” Responses were recorded on a six-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree.”
b. Robustness. We asked two questions to explore the impact of familiarity with a procedure
on preferences: “First, which of the following procedures have you had experience with in
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dealing with a land use situation?” The response scale was: “used over five times”; “used 3–5
times”; “used 1–2 times”; and “never used.” Second: “In the past, which of the following
procedures have members of your family and/or your friends or neighbors had personal
experience with in a land use situation?” The same response scale was used.
c. Consensus. We asked a series of questions to assess the extent to which views about
different procedures were widely shared.
i. Ideology. The first ideological evaluation involved respondents’ liberal-conservative
orientation. Two items were used, each with a seven-point response scale: “When it
comes to political and social issues, how would you describe yourself (extremely liberal–
extremely conservative)?”; and “In terms of politics, how would you describe yourself
(strongly Republican–strongly Democratic)?” The two items were highly correlated
(r = 0.82), so they were combined to form a single index (alpha = 0.90). Ideologically, the
sample varied a great deal. Forty percent were liberal, 30 percent moderate, and 30
percent conservative. Similarly, 29 percent were Republican, 26 percent moderate, and
45 percent Democratic.
Trust in local government was measured using a multi-item scale. The items were:
“Would you agree or disagree that you have confidence in the people running the fol-
lowing institutions?”: “Your local government leaders”; and “Your local government staff-
ers”; and do you agree or disagree that: “You can usually trust your local government to
do what is right”; “You are generally satisfied with the actions of local government regard-
ing land use”; “You feel that local government is run for the equal benefit of all the
people in your community”; “When you participate in local government your views are
listened to”; “Local government is too strongly influenced by special interests looking out
for themselves” (reverse scored); “The actions of local government are often frustrating”
(reverse scored); “People like yourself have too little influence in local government”
(reverse scored); and “There is not much about your local government that you feel
proud of” (reverse scored). Each item used a six-point response scale ranging from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The 10 items were combined into a trust in local
government scale (alpha = 0.92).
Trust in state government was measured using a three-item scale with the same
six-point set of response alternatives noted above. The items were: “Would you agree or
disagree that you have confidence in the people running the following institutions”: “The
executive branch of the Florida State government”; “The Florida Legislature”; “and “Regu-
latory agencies of the State government.” The three items were combined into a trust in
state government scale (alpha = 0.70).
Respondents were also asked about their trust in two nongovernmental actors: non-
governmental organizations and the development community. Single-item indices of both
types of trust were included. All used the “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” set of
response alternatives.
ii. Ties to the community. The respondents’ identification with the community was mea-
sured using a nine-item scale that measured: identification with the community, pride in
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the community, and believing that one is respected by the community. The items were:
“Being a member of your local community is important to the way that you think of
yourself as a person”; “You are proud to think of yourself as a member of your local
community”; “There are many people in your community that you think of as friends”;
“What your local community stands for is important to you”; “You often talk up your
community as a great place to live”; “Most of the people in your community share
your values”; “Most of the people in your community respect you and the way you live
your life”; “People in your community generally recognize your contributions to the com-
munity”; and “Most of the people in your community respect your values.” Respondents
were also asked whether people in their community help each other. The items used to
make this assessment were: “People in your community would help you if you needed it”;
“In an emergency you could count on others in your community”; “The people in your
community generally consider everyone’s needs when making community decisions”;
and “You can trust your neighbors to take account of your concerns when making
community decisions.” The items used the previously outlined set of response alter-
natives, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The items were all com-
bined into a single index reflecting each respondent’s links to his or her community
(alpha = 0.89).
iii. Position in the community—interests. Four groups were defined: government (elected
official, planning/zoning board member, local government staff, and state or regional
agency staff; N = 38); citizen (member of a citizen’s group, civic group, neighborhood
association, or environmental group; N = 71); owner (property owner, developer, farmer,
businessperson, realtor; N = 33); and professional (attorney, consultant, N = 42). The 44
remaining respondents were unclassified.
iv. Demographics. Finally, we consider standard demographic information: race, income,
education, gender, and age.
d. Procedurality—Bases for Acceptability. People were asked a series of questions on proce-
dural elements to assess the degree to which they believe that a particular procedural
attribute is associated with a procedure (see Tyler 1988; Tyler & Lind 1992). This includes
thinking that a procedure will enable them to win, and believing that the decision-making
aspects of the procedure are fair, that is, believing that they will have an adequate chance
to make their arguments and thinking that the decision will be made neutrally, and that the
procedure involves high-quality interpersonal treatment of those involved in it (i.e., believ-
ing that they and their rights will be respected and believing that the procedure will allow
them to evaluate the trustworthiness of the decisionmakers). In each case, respondents
were asked whether a procedure had the element mentioned using response alternatives
ranging from “disagree strongly” to “agree strongly.”
• Likelihood of winning. “This procedure gives you some control over the outcome”; and
“This procedure allows you to achieve the outcome you want” (average alpha 0.93).
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• Procedural justice
• Voice. Two questions: “This procedure provides people an adequate opportunity
to present their arguments to the decision maker(s)”; and “This procedure gives
people an adequate opportunity to make their points.”
• Neutrality. Three questions: “This procedure will lead to a decision that accurately
reflects laws and regulations”; “This procedure will lead to a decision based upon
a consideration of the facts”; and “This procedure will lead to a decision reflecting
a consistent application of the law and applicable regulations.”
• Trust. Four questions: “This procedure gives people the information they need
to determine whether they can trust the motives of others involved in making the
decision”; “This procedure gives people the opportunity to easily obtain infor-
mation relevant to the substance of the proposals being considered”; “The
reasons for the decision will be adequately explained [in this procedure]”; and
“This procedure takes account of the needs and concerns of people like you.”
• Respect. Two questions: “This procedure adequately protects people’s rights” and
“This procedure treats people with dignity and respect.”
The procedural justice items were combined into an overall procedural justice scale.
The average reliability across the five procedures was 0.97.
e. Nonjustice Issues. Four questions measured nonjustice issues: “This procedure is too
costly for people like you to participate in”; “This procedure is scheduled at times of the day
that make it hard for people like you to participate”; “This procedure takes too much time




One approach to examining the legitimacy of procedures is to look at whether or not
people say they are willing to accept the outcomes of those procedures. Forty-nine percent
expressed willingness to accept negotiated solutions; 46 percent public hearing solutions;
60 percent administrative litigation; 75 percent court hearings; and 61 percent referenda.
These percentages suggest that the use of a particular procedure matters. By using court
hearings, for example, the acceptability of a decision increases from 49 percent to 75
percent, a 26 percent increase. Hence, these findings very much support the argument that
choosing different procedures will matter in terms of the acceptability of the outcome.
Table 1 shows the mean acceptability of each procedure, as determined by people’s
indication of their willingness to defer to that procedure by accepting its outcomes. The
scale ranges from 1–6, with high scores indicating a greater willingness to defer. The results
of a t test indicate that people judge three procedures to be significantly more acceptable
than private negotiation (mean = 3.24): adjudication (mean = 4.05); administrative
law hearings (mean = 3.58); and public referendums (mean = 3.69). Public hearings
(mean = 3.19) are viewed as the least acceptable of the five procedures we studied and are
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not viewed as more acceptable than negotiation among the parties (i.e., private ordering).11
Because the distribution of acceptability for courts showed significant skewness, the analysis
was replicated using a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test, which is not based on
assuming a normal distribution. As is shown in Table 1, the results are the same.
The greater acceptability of third-party procedures is striking in light of Thibaut and
Walker’s (1975) arguments about people’s desire to keep control of outcomes. However,
Thibaut and Walker note that people willingly seek third-party control over decisions when
they believe it is needed to resolve disputes. Further, other researchers also find support for
third-party control. For example, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) suggest that people
often do not want to be involved in political decision making; instead, they prefer to have
authorities make decisions. However, they only defer to authorities when they believe that
decisions will be fairly made.
2. Robustness
We first examined the influence of personal experience with procedures on their accept-
ability. The results are shown in Table 2. They indicate that in no case did experiencing a
procedure lead to more negative views about that procedure. Adjudication was also found
to be desirable in that those people who used adjudication rate it as more acceptable than
do nonusers (t (185) = 2.35, p < 0.05; see Table 2). Adjudication is the only procedure that
differs significantly in acceptability between users and nonusers, suggesting that, in general,
11Because adjudication is the most acceptable procedure, we can ask whether it is more acceptable than other
procedures. An analysis suggests that adjudication is more acceptable than a referendum (t (175) = 1.98, p = 0.05);
administrative hearings (t (174) = 4.94, p < 0.001); negotiation (t (175)=6.74, p < 0.001); and political hearings
(t (185) = 7.01, p < 0.001).
Table 1: Mean Acceptability
Mean
Comparison to Negotiation
t Test Wilcoxon Test
Negotiation 3.24 — —
(186)
Public hearing 3.19 t (185) = 0.42 z = 0.52
(221)
Administrative law hearing 3.58 t (169) = 3.50*** z = 3.31***
(186)
Judicial adjudication 4.05 t (175) = 6.74*** z = 5.96***
(187)
Public referendum 3.69 t (175) = 2.13* z = 2.09*
(188)
Note: The scales range from 1 to 6, with 1 indicating “strongly disagree” and 6 indicating “strongly agree.” *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The number in parentheses in the Mean column is the number of respondents who provided
responses on the two procedures being considered.
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personal experience is not a strong influence on evaluations of the willingness to accept a
procedure. A nonparametric analysis (Mann-Whitney test) shows similar results.
It is also possible to consider the influence of indirect information about a proce-
dure. To explore the influence of indirect experience on procedural acceptability respon-
dents were asked whether their family, friends, or neighbors had used particular
procedures. A comparison is shown in Table 3. As Table 3 indicates, those who have friends,
family, or neighbors who have used various procedures do not differ in their judgments of
their acceptability. A nonparametric analysis (Mann-Whitney test) shows similar results.
The only procedure influenced by information from one’s own or others’ experience
is adjudication, with those having more personal familiarity expressing greater willingness
to accept decisions made through courts. Hence, adjudication is the most desirable proce-
dure in terms of its robustness.







Negotiation 3.28 3.04 t (184) = 0.82 z = 1.08
(160) (26)
Public hearing 3.19 3.20 t (219) = 0.02 z = 0.05
(211) (10)
Administrative law hearing 3.68 3.37 t (184) = 1.38 z = 1.58
(124) (62)
Judicial adjudication 4.28 3.81 t (185) = 2.35* z = 2.42*
(97) (90)
Public referendum 3.94 3.53 t (186) = 1.52 z = 1.53
(71) (117)
Note: The scales range from 1 to 6, with 1 indicating “strongly disagree” and 6 indicating “strongly agree.” *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.







Negotiation 3.22 3.33 t (184) = 0.49 z = 0.33
(144) (42)
Public hearing 3.16 3.35 t (219) = 0.64 z = 0.66
(190) (31)
Administrative law hearing 3.44 3.75 t (184) = 1.45 z = 1.69
(106) (80)
Judicial adjudication 4.03 4.08 t (185) = 0.21 z = 0.14
(95) (92)
Public referendum 3.90 3.50 t (186) = 1.77 z = 1.70
(71) (117)
Note: The scales range from 1 to 6, with 1 indicating “strongly disagree” and 6 indicating “strongly agree.” *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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3. Consensus
In comparing the procedural preferences of different types of people, we distinguish
between four features that might divide people. Those are ideology/views about govern-
ment; ties to the community; position in the community/interests; and demographics.
The first question is whether these factors shape the acceptability of different proce-
dures. An ideal procedure would not be impacted by these factors, so little variance in
procedural acceptability would be explained by these respondent features. If these factors
explain a large amount of variance in acceptability, it suggests that acceptability is not
constant across people in the study.
A comparison of the five procedures using OLS regression indicates that the
least amount of variance in acceptability is explained by antecedent factors with adjudica-
tion (13 percent; see Table 4).12 This is less than is found with negotiation (18 percent),
referendums (18 percent), administrative hearings (21 percent), and political hearings
12Before using OLS regression, an effort was made to examine whether the data met appropriate underlying
assumptions. In each case, the residuals were graphed and examined. Because it is a skewed variable, the court
acceptability analysis was also conducted using a dichotomized dependent variable, resulting in approximately the
same explanatory power (8 percent). It is also important to note that the different dependent variables in the
equations for each procedure use the same wording but refer to distinct procedures. This needs to be considered
when comparing columns.








Political ideology -0.04 -0.07 -0.14 -0.12 -0.04
Views about local government 0.31*** 0.48*** -0.03 -0.12 -0.31***
Views about state government 0.12 0.10 0.32*** 0.25* 0.12
Views about NGOs 0.16 0.06 0.05 -0.18 0.16
Views about developers 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.17
Identification with community -0.05 0.03 -0.07 0.24* -0.05
Government official -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.15 -0.01
Interested citizen 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.14 0.01
Property owner -0.02 0.13 0.07 0.02 -0.02
Lawyer and consultant 0.09 0.09 0.30* 0.18 -0.04
Age -0.04 -0.17* -0.13 -0.05 -0.04
Education -0.05 -0.22* -0.11 0.23* -0.05
Income 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.14
Race -0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.03
Gender -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.04
Familiarity -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.10 -0.02
Adj. R 2 18% 33% 21% 13% 18%
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Note: High scores indicate that people will accept a decision from a particular procedure. It also means they are
conservative, like government and feel it should be involved, identify with their community, think neighbors will help
and do care, are either a government official (38), citizen (71), owner (33), or lawyer/consultant (42). All significant
effects are shown.
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(33 percent). These findings suggest that public hearings are an especially problema-
tic procedure from the perspective of the influence of antecedent conditions on the
willingness to accept results.
The findings concerning antecedent conditions suggest that respondents’ trust
in government is a key issue in their judgments about procedures. If people trust
local government, they are more supportive of using negotiations and public hearing
procedures, and less supportive of referendums. If they trust state government, they favor
administrative hearings and judicial adjudication. Ideology generally had little influence
on judgments.
Ties to the community led to support for adjudication. In terms of interests,
lawyers and consultants favored administrative legal solutions. Older respondents opposed
public hearings. Finally, the highly educated also opposed public hearings and favored
adjudication.
It is striking that familiarity is not linked to the acceptability of any of the procedures.
Hence, in general, whether people had personal experience with a procedure had little to
do with whether they would accept its outcomes. This is consistent with the previously
reported weak influence of personal experience on acceptability.
4. Procedurality
An additional concern in evaluating procedures is with the degree to which procedures
gain their acceptability on procedural grounds, rather than because they are anticipated to
yield favorable outcomes. A desirable procedure is one that is legitimate for procedural
reasons, independent of its anticipated outcomes, since it is unlikely that any procedure can
give everyone the outcomes they want.
To test the procedurality of the different approaches we can directly compare the
influence of procedural justice and two instrumental issues—the likelihood of winning and
nonfairness issues—on acceptability for each of the five procedures controlling for back-
ground factors. To do this analysis, the four procedural indices were combined to form an
overall index of procedural justice.
A regression analysis that examines procedural justice influences on acceptability
(see Table 5)13 indicates that the justice of procedures is always a significant independent
influence on their acceptability. Interestingly, there are two “pure” procedures in the sense
that only procedural issues shape their acceptability: adjudication and administrative hear-
ings. The other procedures are influenced by both procedural and outcome judgments.
13As before, residuals were graphed and examined. Further, the relationships between procedural justice, instrumen-
tal judgments, nonfairness judgments, and the dependent variables were tested for linearity. Finally, an analysis using
a dichotomized dependent variable for court acceptability produced findings consistent with those shown. The
possibility of multicollinearity was also considered. The correlation among three judgments—procedural justice,
instrumental judgments, and nonfairness criteria—was calculated for each of the five procedures. Across
the five procedures, the average correlation was 0.50, which does not suggest that there were problems of this
type.
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This same pattern also emerges if we consider only those respondents with prior personal
experience with the procedures (Table 6).14
These findings suggest that procedures can be evaluated by the degree to which they
are pure procedures, whose acceptability is linked to procedural issues and not to their
anticipated outcomes. When such an evaluation is made, administrative and adjudication
procedures emerge as very desirable. To a striking degree, people indicate a willingness to
accept their outcomes on procedural grounds, to the extent that they are unaffected by the
anticipated outcomes in the case of administrative hearings. Judicial adjudication also
emerges as a very desirable procedure on the same grounds.
Of the other procedures, political hearings emerge as second-tier procedures in terms
of procedurality. They are dominated by procedural evaluations, although they have second-
ary influences of anticipated outcome. The final two procedures—negotiation and
referendums—are about as strongly influenced by their anticipated outcome, with referen-
dums the only procedure in which outcomes matter more than procedural features. Hence,
referendums are an especially poor choice for decision making on procedurality grounds.
14In the case of the referendum, some minor differences emerge, since most respondents have no personal
experience with this procedure and the resulting subsample is small.








Outcomes 0.34** 0.26* -0.10 0.17 0.43***
Nonfairness issues -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02
Procedural justice 0.47** 0.53*** 0.81*** 0.53*** 0.37***
Political ideology 0.00 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05
Views about government—L 0.13* 0.12 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07
Views about government—ST 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.09 -0.07
Views about NGOs 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.07
Views about developers -.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.18* -0.02
Identification with community -0.11 0.02 -0.04 0.15* 0.06
Government official 0.06 -0.01 -0.06 0.11 -0.04
Interested citizen 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 0.01
Property owner 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.00
Lawyer and consultant 0.06 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.00
Age 0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.01 0.03
Education -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 0.17* -0.05
Income 0.15* 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.03
Race -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.08
Gender -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10*
Adj. R 2 68% 66% 67% 48% 76%
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Note: High scores indicate that people will accept a decision from a particular procedure. It also means they are
conservative, like government and feel it should be involved, identify with their community, think neighbors will help
and do care, are either a government official (38), citizen (71), owner (33), or lawyer/consultant (42). All significant
effects are shown.
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5. Nonjustice Issues
An examination of Table 5 indicates that nonfairness issues do not significantly influence
the acceptability of any of the procedures (cost, delay). This is interesting because an
examination of the mean on nonfairness concerns, shown in Table 7, gives high scores on
nonfairness issues to negotiation and the worst scores to adjudication. While respondents
give adjudication poor marks for cost, convenience, and so forth, evaluations on these
dimensions are unrelated to whether the results of a procedure would be accepted. Table 6
shows the results of this analysis among only those who have personally experienced each
procedure. The results are the same.
Adjudication is a less desirable procedure in terms of its cost, inconvenience, and
time to decision. However, the respondents, while recognizing these negatives, do not
consider these issues when deciding whether a procedure is desirable.15 This supports our
general suggestion that peoples’ primary concern is that “justice be done” and, while they
recognize issues such as cost and inconvenience, they prefer procedures that deliver justice,
even if they have collateral costs. This concern for justice may be particularly central to
evaluations of procedures that are being put in place to manage future disputes. Studies of
15Procedural desirability could be thought of as a tradeoff between justice and other issues, such as cost and delay, but
these findings suggest that respondents are not making such a tradeoff. Rather, they are simply evaluating procedures
in terms of justice.









P(win) 0.40*** 0.24** -0.02 0.18 0.27*
Nonfairness issues -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.05
Procedural justice 0.42*** 0.53*** 0.82*** 0.46*** 0.57**
Adj. R 2 68% 66% 68% 36% 70%
Number with experience 188 215 142 109 86
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Note: All effects are shown. This table omits the background factors shown in Table 5, which were included as
controls in this analysis, but are not shown in the table.








Mean acceptability 4.04 3.69 3.01 2.54 3.37
(0.93) (1.20) (1.26) (1.15) (1.17)
Note: High scores indicate that a procedure does not have problems of cost and delay. All the third-party procedures
are significantly less desirable on nonfairness grounds.
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people with personal experiences in court about cases in which they were involved finds
that issues of cost influence evaluations of the courts (Rottman 2005), although such
influences are found to be small (Rottman 2005; Tyler 2001).
6. Limitations in Our Results
We believe our findings offer important insights for the design of decision-making pro-
cesses; however, we note several qualifications. We previously have suggested that key
contextual issues have the potential to influence preferences, such as the stakes involved in
a decision, the contentiousness of the issues, and the clarity of the outcome, as well as the
capabilities of likely interested parties, among others (Markell & Tyler 2008). We did not
explore in this study the possible impact of these types of contextual differences on process
preferences. For example, we asked about the general category of rezoning requests but did
not seek to distinguish between and among process preferences based on the significance
of such requests (e.g., we did not seek to distinguish between a relatively limited rezoning,
such as a rezoning of a single parcel, vs. a more significant rezoning, such as the rezoning
of a substantial part of a community; or, similarly, any difference in preferences between a
relatively confined rezoning from single-family residential use on one-acre parcels to such
use on half-acre parcels, compared to a more dramatic rezoning from single-family resi-
dential to industrial or apartments). It is certainly possible that people’s preferences would
vary based on these types of contextual differences, as the efforts of the courts to make
distinctions in standard of review and so forth based on such differences attest (Board of
County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder 1993). Of course, community members do
not know what issues will become important in the future when they institutionalize a
conflict management procedure for making policy decisions, so our approach mirrors the
external world. Nonetheless, follow-up research would be valuable to explore the impacts
on preferences of these contextual variables.
Other contextual differences may shape preferences as well. For example, it may well
be that respondents would prefer different procedures for different aspects of the regula-
tory process. People might have different preferences, for instance, for processes used to
make policy-making decisions (e.g., what do we want our community to look like, including
what types of land uses within our community do we want to encourage), compared to
processes used to make parcel-specific decisions (e.g., should we allow a property zoned
residential to be rezoned for commercial use, or should we allow a variance to permit uses
of a particular property that are inconsistent with zoning requirements). Even the same
entity may make different types of decisions depending on the issues before it. In our
specific context, notably land-use decision making in Florida, for example, local govern-
ments may act in a “legislative capacity” in some cases (e.g., enactment of original zoning
ordinances) and in a “quasi-judicial” capacity in others (e.g., the “application of a general
rule of policy”) (Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder 1993).
A related possible aspect of context that could shape preferences is that significant
variations exist among each of the types of procedures we studied (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse
2002). It is obviously possible that preferences would differ for different variations of the
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same types of processes. There is not just one way to conduct an administrative hearing or
a public hearing. Judicial adjudication includes appellate argument and trial-type proceed-
ings. Similarly, an enormous range of possible variations in aspects of the adjudication may
affect preferences, such as the standard of judicial review, who has the burden of proof, and
the like. Again, this is the case in the specific context of land-use decision making in Florida
as in others (Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder 1993). In addition,
there is the possibility that despite our inclusion of descriptions of the processes we were
asking about, familiarity with variations of these processes may have affected the prefer-
ences expressed. From a study design perspective it is not possible to capture all possible
nuances of each type of procedure, so we sought to create a prototypical version of each
type of procedure.
Further, the evaluations of concern here are ex ante evaluations of procedures in
which the respondent may or may not be or expect to be personally involved. This study,
in other words, is concerned with ex ante judgments about the desirability of procedures
as ways to make decisions about land use in one’s community. It concerns community
governance, not private disputes. Although we did ask about postuse evaluations, and
found that respondents’ views concerning the desirability of procedures generally do not
change with use, as we have noted at various points, the traditional procedural justice
literature focuses heavily on the satisfaction of the consumers of legal services, and ex
post judgments of the type studied in that literature may be quite different because they
involve evaluations of a single use of a procedure that involved the respondent’s own
case.16
And, finally, our choice of respondents, and our approach to circulating the survey
instrument, highlight a broader question, notably: Whose views are relevant to questions
concerning governance structure? Is it the general public? Is it members of the public with
a particular level of interest in the questions at issue? Or is it the group that is most likely
to actually participate, that is, activists? As noted in Section III, in this effort we focused on
individuals and organizations that were most likely to participate in the procedures we
identified. For some purposes, investigations of the views of broader, random cross-sections
of the population are obviously appropriate. This issue is an important one for method-
ological design.
D. Discussion
This article explores public views concerning the acceptability of different procedures
for regulating land-use decisions. The respondents are Florida stakeholders from commu-
nities in which these land-use decisions are being made. Each respondent is asked to
evaluate five alternative procedures for making land-use decisions—four procedures in
16There is a parallel literature on procedural justice in work settings. Within that literature, employees are often asked
to evaluate the overall fairness of the procedures in their workplace, as well as the procedures they have personally
experienced (see Tyler & Blader 2000). That literature suggests that similar issues define procedural fairness at both
levels.
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which possible decisions are regulated in some manner by the larger community, and one
procedure involving unregulated negotiation among the parties directly involved in the
land at issue.
This study begins with the premise that if land-use decisions are to be regulated, it is
important to consider public views about how that regulation should occur. Legitimacy is a
key to effective and sustainable governance (Jost & Major 2001; Tyler 2006b); our premise
is that soliciting, understanding, and incorporating public views about the appropriate
shape and content of regulation will help enhance the legitimacy of governance in general
and the relevant government processes in particular.
In this article, we suggest a five-part conceptual framework for considering public
views concerning different processes for making decisions with public impacts. One obvious
place to start is to ascertain public views about the acceptability of decisions made using
different procedures. Acceptability is one aspect of overall legitimacy, and the aspect
perhaps most central to the authoritativeness of a procedure (Tyler 2007). As Table 1 and
the accompanying discussion reflect, adjudication is the most acceptable procedure, with
administrative law hearings and public referendum deemed more acceptable than nego-
tiations as well. Public hearings are the only public procedure not considered preferable to
private negotiations.
We believe this initial set of findings is of interest for at least six reasons. First, the
finding that judicial adjudication is acceptable to many respondents is consistent with the
literature, which has found that the court system has a cushion of support (Gibson et al.
1998). People are generally willing to defer to decisions made in courts, although such
deference is obviously not universal.
Second, the distinction respondents draw between judicial and administrative adju-
dication is relevant to how and where adjudication is conducted—which courts, if you will,
should hear different types of cases. While they do not receive as much attention, admin-
istrative tribunals in the United States far outnumber their better-known state and federal
judicial counterparts. According to the Office of Administrative Law Judges, administra-
tive law judges outnumber their counterparts by roughly three to one. A substantial
amount of adjudicative work has been “outsourced” to agencies (Resnik 2006; Mullins
1991). There are normative debates about the relative advantages and disadvantages that
judicial and administrative tribunals provide. Administrative adjudicative bodies are
thought to be more accessible because of their relative informality, and also are thought
to be preferable in some cases because of their greater efficiency (Carlisle 1986). On the
other hand, since the high-water mark days of Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), the corollary has
been that the “federal template” for adjudication procedures has not always been applied
in the administrative context (Pierce 2009; Resnik 2006). Further, there may be legal and
practical limitations in public access to administrative proceedings and to the decisions
they produce (Resnik 2006). This normative debate about the types of cases administrative
bodies should be empowered to hear should also be informed by the public’s preferences
(see Mashaw 1985). For example, some studies suggest that people like the formalities
associated with judicial litigation (Hensler 2002; Lind et al. 1990). Additional research to
understand the reasons for and extent of such preferences would be helpful to informing
debates about the types of issues we have outlined above concerning the appropriate roles
The Public Regulation of Land-Use Decisions 563
and structures of different facets of our court system, including its judicial and adminis-
trative components.
In addition, public preferences arguably should inform the debate about a range of
other issues of enormous importance to the shape and operation of our adjudicatory
apparatus. For example, there are questions about the types of relief administrative adju-
dicative bodies should be able to award (McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board 1989;
Wong Wing v. United States 1896), and about the impact of administrative decisions on court
jurisdiction (e.g., the circumstances in which an administrative decision should foreclose
reconsideration of the issues involved by a court, and exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies) (University of Tennessee v. Elliott 1986; Reiter v. Cooper 1993). In short, while some of
these issues raise constitutional questions, others are susceptible to legislative or other
tinkering. The debate over possible reconfigurations would, again, benefit from under-
standing of public preferences.
In addition to questions concerning the appropriate parameters for judicial and
administrative forums, there are questions concerning the appropriate shape or structure
of administrative tribunals that might benefit from more sophisticated understanding of
public preferences. For example, the issue of whether jurisdictions (e.g., the federal gov-
ernment and the different states) should centralize their administrative forums or maintain
de-centralized structures has received considerable attention in the literature and, in recent
years, several jurisdictions have changed their structures (Hardwicke 2001).
The level of support for judicial and administrative adjudication raises basic ques-
tions about the operation of our court system and, in particular, about its accessibility. For
example, several doctrines limit access to the courts and to agency adjudication tribunals,
such as the requirement of fees, standing, and ripeness (Resnik 2006; Massachusetts v. EPA
2007). Others, such as the recoverability of attorney fees, similarly have very real practical
consequences for the availability of the courts to resolve disputes (Buckhannon Board & Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources 2001). One question the
findings raise is whether public preferences should inform these legal doctrines, some of
which have constitutional roots and therefore have limited flexibility, but others of which
are prudential or shaped by legislation, and therefore are more amenable to change
(Bennett v. Spear 1997; Resnik 2006).
The level of support for public referendums (more acceptable than public hearings
and private negotiations and less acceptable than judicial or administrative adjudication)
should be of interest to proponents of referendums and skeptics as well. There is a
significant ongoing debate about the merits of referendums and their place within our
system of governance (Selmi 2002). There is support in our findings for different perspec-
tives, but they do not suggest that people generally prefer referendums to traditional legal
procedures. Our hope is that our framework, and these results, will provide impetus for
further work in this area.
Fifth, the finding that fewer than one-half of respondents believe public hearings are
an acceptable way of resolving land-use issues, and the finding that such hearings are less
acceptable than any other public procedure, should be cause for concern for those inter-
ested in legitimacy of local governance. Local governments rely heavily on public hearings
in making land-use decisions in Florida (Nelson 1995; Brody et al. 2003). Thus, widespread
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dissatisfaction with such hearings raises a red flag about one of the main ways local
governments interact with their citizenry.
Our speculation is that respondents’ dissatisfaction stems from their viewing public
hearings as pro forma in practice, and not where real decision making occurs. In proce-
dural justice terms, they do not trust that the consideration of their views that is occurring
is sincere, so they do not trust the decisionmakers (Tyler & Kramer 2006). Further,
respondents may have been expressing skepticism about the value of public comments
during such hearings (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002) or, perhaps, skepticism about
whether participants generally are well-informed and offer normatively helpful input,
although this issue is generally unexamined in the procedural justice literature.
We also believe there are other possible explanations, such as the distaste for par-
ticipating in contentious processes in which diverse opinions are aired (Hibbing & Theiss-
Morse 2002). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) note that people dislike the conflict
associated with involvement in politics, but want a chance to voice their concerns to
authorities. Some forms of political hearing take this into account and create procedures
that provide voice but lower the level of interpersonal conflict. For example, in electronic
balloting, participants can communicate their views and those views are aggregated and
shown on a screen. So people can have voice without conflict in the sense that they do not
need to deliberate and try to find generally acceptable solutions through interpersonal
conflict. In general, it is important to distinguish having voice from being involved in
deliberation. In a trial setting, each party addresses the judge, but they do not interact with
each other. This is a reflection of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s idea that people want a
neutral third party to make decisions. A jury, in contrast, is based on the idea that people
actually deliberate, rather than simply vote. Such deliberation has the messy and conflictual
features of decision making that people apparently find disturbing (as anyone who has
watched Twelve Angry Men can easily understand). The fundamental procedural design
issue is whether people want to have voice or deliberation or both in a procedure.
As a practical matter, we anticipate that this finding of disaffection with public
hearings ultimately may be the most important result of the study. Little other work has
been done to explore the public’s views concerning the acceptability of public hearings
either ex ante or ex post. The existence of widespread disaffection should lead researchers
and others to investigate why public hearings enjoy so little support, and how public
hearings can be improved to win greater support. Thus, these findings warrant further
research, first to gauge their replicability, but also to explore why public hearings have
such a significant public perception problem, and whether steps can be taken to improve
the acceptability of such hearings. In their provocative work, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
point in one possible direction, notably, that people “want the individuals who make
political decisions to be empathetic, non-self-interested decision makers (ENSIDs). And
while empathy is nice, ridding the system of self-interested behavior is more important”
(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002).
And, sixth, we believe our findings pose interesting questions for the shape of
administrative governance more broadly, beyond the local level. In the contemporary
administrative state, agencies tend to make binding decisions using one of two types of
processes. Agencies either use their adjudicatory authority to make decisions, or they make
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decisions through their rule-making powers (Pierce 2009). This is, of course, a gross
simplification (Croley 1998), but nevertheless captures key features of the operation of the
administrative state. Agencies consider a range of strategies in deciding whether to use
adjudication or rule making to establish policy (Pierce 2009). Although the local gov-
ernment public hearings we study in this project differ substantially from the notice-
and-comment rule making most agencies use to formulate rules, the range in acceptability
we found suggests that there is fertile ground for researching public acceptability as part of
ongoing efforts to improve agencies’ choice of decision-making tools (Coglianese & Nash
2006).
As the article reflects, we believe that a more nuanced framework for considering
acceptability beyond simply evaluating overall acceptability of different processes is helpful
to informing understanding of public views relevant to legitimacy. We argue it is appropri-
ate to consider four other criteria in reviewing possible procedures: robustness (whether a
procedure is considered favorably by those who have used it—if so, this is likely to bolster
its sustainability), consensus (involving the extent to which a procedure is well-regarded by
a broad cross-section of the community as opposed to enjoying narrow support by a small
segment of the relevant population), procedurality (the extent to which a procedure is
preferred because of its perceived fairness rather than because of the outcomes it is
anticipated to produce), and nonjustice issues (delay, cost, etc.).
The findings on robustness tend to bolster the findings concerning overall accept-
ability summarized above. Judicial adjudication is considered most desirable in that those
people who used it rate it as more acceptable than do nonusers. Again, respondents appear
to perceive judicial adjudication differently from the administrative variety. We think it is
also of interest that in no case did personal experience with a procedure lead to more
negative views. Our inclusion of robustness was to enable us to emphasize different per-
ceptions. On the one hand, with acceptability, we wanted to assess the ex ante, abstract views
about different procedures. With robustness, we wanted to evaluate perspectives about
these same procedures based on real-world participation in them by the respondents or
their family members or neighbors. We believe each type of preference is important and
that it is especially helpful to evaluate them in tandem.
The findings on consensus again support judicial adjudication as the most preferred
procedure. Again, the findings reflect that the respondents differentiate between judicial
and administrative adjudication. They confirm our intuition that respondents who have
confidence in government would be relatively strong supporters of public hearings and
skeptics about referendums.
We believe there is a need for theorizing regarding the salience of consensus
as a variable. Many of the same issues raised about procedural justice itself can also be
raised about consensus. Is there a normative model that would tell us which dimensions
ought to receive consideration and which are not important? In many areas of gover-
nance, disparities due to racial- or gender-based biases are considered suspect, but is there
a larger framework for addressing such concerns? In other words, ought the acceptability
of a procedure across liberal and conservative political views be a special concern? What
about agreement across levels of income or among developers and environmentalists,
etc.?
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Absent a normative model for addressing the question of appropriate criteria for
consensus, we might also ask the same question politically. Whose buy-in is important from
the pragmatic perspective of making decisions that actually work within the community?
For example, whatever the normative merits of the Roe v. Wade (1973) abortion decision, it
receives low marks as a decision that actually put a contentious political issue to rest. Similar
concerns are relevant to decisions about land use. Whose consent is more relevant? We note
that we treat all potential differences we identified as equally important in evaluating
consensus.
Fourth, in terms of procedurality, the salient findings here are that: (1) each of the
studied procedures “does well” under this criterion in the sense that respondents consider
the fairness of the process in evaluating its acceptability; (2) in terms of being judged
primarily in procedural terms, judicial and administrative adjudication do best; (3) again,
respondents draw distinctions between judicial and administrative adjudication, though
here administrative adjudication does best; and (4) referendums are the worst of the
procedures studied in that they are not primarily evaluated in procedural terms.
Finally, the responses concerning nonfairness issues are of interest for several
reasons. First, they appear to have had no effect on acceptability. Thus, adjudication is the
most acceptable procedure despite the perception that it does worst in terms of the
nonfairness concerns. In addition, we believe that the findings concerning the relative
weight respondents attach to procedural justice versus outcomes versus nonfairness factors
suggest an important insight concerning public hearings. Public hearings did the best of all
public procedures in terms of the nonfairness factors we asked about (cost, accessibility,
etc.). Yet, as we summarize above, public hearings are deemed less acceptable than any
other public procedure. Further, as noted above, all the other public procedures do better
than public hearings even though each of these other procedures does worse with respect
to the nonfairness issues. This suggests that, at a practical level, attempted fixes to public
hearings that focus primarily on cost of participation, accessibility, and so forth are not
likely to pay off, although, of course, that does not mean that improvements in these
nonfairness areas should be ignored. Instead, efforts to improve public hearings should
focus on underlying procedural justice concerns given the importance respondents
attached to these concerns in evaluating such hearings. Similarly, the nonfairness advan-
tages of negotiation carried very little weight among respondents, who preferred more
costly and inconvenient, but fairer procedures.
IV. Conclusion
A. Land Use
The desirability of the five procedures on each of the five criteria is summarized in Figure 1.
A review of the rating of these procedures on the criteria noted—acceptability, robustness,
consensus, procedurality, and nonfairness-related issues—suggests that the most desirable
procedure in a situation in which a universal procedure is to be put in place is judicial
adjudication. Following in desirability is the administrative law hearing. Other procedures
also have desirable attributes, although none is as generally desirable as are the two legal
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adjudication procedures. Of the seven criteria outlined in Figure 1, adjudication is superior
in terms of six, and administrative law hearings in terms of four. The other procedures fare
worse in this evaluation: political hearings (two); referendums (two); and negotiation
(three).
The findings strongly support the argument that people want legal adjudication
procedures to be in place. While, as private parties, people sometimes may resist legal
control over their decisions, as members of the community people generally want to have a
mechanism for public regulation to be in place, and they want that procedure to be the legal
procedure of judicial adjudication. They prefer this legal procedure to political control,
administrative hearings, and public control via referendums. As we have noted, this conclu-
sion is similar to that of others studying political decision making who also find that people
want authorities to make decisions (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002; Tyler & Degoey 1995).
The strong support for adjudication is important because it suggests that people
value the legal framework as an approach within which to make decisions about the








1. The procedure is 
    acceptable (relative to 
    negotiation).  
2a. The procedure is robust
      against experience (its 
      use does not undermine
      its acceptability).    
2b. Acceptability becomes
      greater with use.  
3. There is a consensus about 
    desirability (background
    factors do not influence 
    acceptability).
        4a. Acceptability is not linked 
     to anticipated outcomes.  
     4b. Acceptability is linked
     primarily to procedural
     features. 
5. Procedure is strong on
    nonfairness issues (cost,
    convenience, etc.).
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community. Public regulation could potentially be managed in a variety of ways, political,
legal, and via referendum, and among those choices the respondents indicated a prefer-
ence for judicial adjudication. Further, their second choice was also a legal procedure—
administrative hearings.
We believe these findings are important at a number of levels. To highlight four we
have elaborated on, they raise questions concerning the availability of the courts to adju-
dicate disputes and the legal doctrines that affect such availability. They also raise ques-
tions concerning differences between different types of adjudication, judicial and
administrative, and the implications of these differences for the shape and use of these
mechanisms. Third, they raise questions about the use of referendums and the role they
should play in the land-use arena. And, finally, they raise questions concerning nonad-
judicatory procedures and, in particular, local government’s use of public hearings as its
primary mechanism to elicit public input and to make decisions. To us, it is inevitable
that nonadjudicatory procedures must retain an important place in the toolbox of gov-
ernments as they make land-use policy; our findings suggest that there would be consid-
erable value to improving understanding of the reasons for disaffection with current
nonadjudicatory procedures and to pursuing opportunities to enhance the acceptability
of such procedures.
B. Empirical Governance
Moving beyond the arena of land use, it is important to consider the implications of
a procedural evaluation approach based on public judgments for developing a general
model of empirical governance. This approach is important for several reasons. First, in a
democratic society it seems self-evident that public views about procedural desirability
ought to be considered when deciding how to manage issues in people’s own communities.
Second, the issue of authoritativeness, for example, the willingness of people to defer to the
results of a procedure, is a key to the effectiveness of the law. If people are not generally
willing to voluntarily defer to the decisions of authorities, then it is difficult to effectively
regulate the actions of members of the public.
Our argument is that it is generally important to consider public views when deciding
how to exercise public control over private and public actors. Here, we use this approach
for understanding how to make land-use decisions, but we recognize that it has broader
application. For example, Markell and Tyler (2008) similarly consider the public’s views
about the desirability of adjudication and other approaches to managing contested envi-
ronmental noncompliance situations. Slobogin and Schumacher (1993) use it to examine
public views about the intrusiveness of various forms of government intrusion into personal
privacy. Robinson and Darley (1995) explore public views about appropriate sanctions for
various types of criminal activity.
Although the arenas studied vary, all these investigators share our view that there are
benefits when the law is consistent with public views about what is desirable and correct.
Robinson and Darley (1995) argue that the law departs from congruence with public views
at its peril, since it is more difficult to enforce laws that do not have the weight of public
morality behind them (also see Robinson 2008; Robinson & Cahill 2006). This argument is
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similar to our own suggestion, drawn from the literature on procedural justice (Lind &
Tyler 1988), that people are more willing to accept decisions made through procedures
they judge to be fair.
Of course, it does not necessarily make sense that the law should simply reflect public
views without any other considerations. For example, Slobogin (1991–1992) argues that
public views should be used to inform how the Fourth Amendment is implemented, but that
the law should not necessarily be a simple reflection of public views. Similarly, Robinson and
Darley (1995) argue that the criminal law should be sensitive to those areas in which a large
gap exists between the actual law and public views about what is just. While not suggesting that
the law simply bring itself into alignment with public views, the authors suggest that the law
consider why discrepancies are found. We, of course, recognize the importance of other
considerations, ranging from practical issues such as time and cost to requirements embod-
ied in the Constitution that are, obviously, not easily susceptible to change.
In this analysis, we move beyond a simple comparison of public views and existing law.
We address the question of how public views ought to be brought into the design of
procedures. We argue that it is sensible, in doing so, to look beyond direct expressions of
authoritativeness by considering other issues that we believe are important to the desirability
of a procedure. For example, we argue that it is important that a procedure bridge across
important groups in the community, for example, liberals and conservatives, environmen-
talists and developers. Thus, we believe it worthwhile to examine whether there is a general
consensus in the community in favor of a procedure. This criterion is distinct from simply
looking at the proportion of people in the community that view a particular procedure as
legitimate.
Similarly, we argue that it is relevant to consider ex post perspectives concerning
procedures to learn whether use of a procedure affects peoples’ perspectives concerning its
acceptability. A procedure that, when used, engenders complaints and disaffection, is less
preferable than one that does not, even if, ex ante, levels of preference are similar. Third,
we contend that “procedurality” is a relevant criterion in undertaking more sophisticated
assessments of procedures that go beyond acceptability. We suggest that because of the
“cushion” or “reservoir” effect and the inevitability in many cases that there will be losers as
well as winners, procedures that are viewed as acceptable because of their perceived fairness
deserve serious attention compared to procedures that are viewed as acceptable because, ex
ante, people are hopeful they will win. And, finally, we argue that it is appropriate to
consider the impact of “nonfairness” issues on acceptability. It is, in our view, helpful to
identify, and isolate, concerns about access, cost, and the like in considering different types
of procedures that are intended to attract citizen participation and produce decisions
citizens will accept.
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